Special Forces Warriors

The Four Special Operations Forces Truths

1. Humans are more important than hardware.
2. Quality is more important than quantity.
3. Special op Forces cannot be massed produced.
4. Competent Sp Op Forces cannot be created after an emergency occurs.

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In November 2001, US Army Special Forces and the British SAS located Osama bin Laden’s hiding place in the mountains of Afghanistan, in a place called Tora Bora. By this time, US conventional generals had arrived, and were now in control of operations. They made many mistakes in the stereotypical tactics they used, while ignoring American and British Special Forces. The US conventional generals actually trusted some Afghan units that were friends of al-Qaeda. During the operation, those backstabbing Muslims assisted Osama bin Laden and his escape into Pakistan.

After the victories of the Special Forces in Afghanistan, the conventional US Army and Marines arrived. With them, they brought their narrow-minded incompetent generals and their stereotypical approach to war. In addition to a battalion or so of Marines, there were a few battalions of the US 10th Mountain Division (which has never received any training on how to fight in mountains), a few battalions of the 101st Air Mobile Division, and a few of the less formidable Delta Force.

In March 2002, it was rumored that Osama bin Laden was back in the Afghan mountains. Elements of conventional US Army forces along with token contingents from a variety of foreign armies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway) launched Operation Anaconda. It was then that the war began to turn against America and its anti-terror coalition. The conventional generals insisted on doing things their way. Their way was neither clever, nor efficient. Thus, one more attempt to capture Osama bin Laden failed because the Special Forces wasn’t running things.

More information about these events is in Secrets of the SAS.